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A turning point for Moldova? A challenge for 
the EU and Moldova
by Stefan Meister
The change of  government in Moldova after the parliamentary elections in July 2009 opened a 
new window of  opportunity for fundamental domestic reforms and integration with the European 
Union.1 With its clear pro-European policy the new government coalition, the Alliance for Euro-
pean Integration, differs from other post-Soviet leaders (excluding Georgia) that mostly follow a 
policy of  balancing between the EU and Russia. The main challenges for the Moldovan govern-
ment are the need for fundamental reforms to change the existing political, social and economic real-
ity and the reintegration of  the separatist region of  Transnistria. Moldova could be a success story 
for EU neighborhood policy. It is small, it currently has a pro-European elite and it has a non-
ethnic resolvable conflict with Transnistria. But in order to succeed in its neighborhood approach, 
the EU has to seriously engage in the Transnistrian conflict and it must develop a real partnership 
for reform with Moldova.
Moldova’s post-Soviet  
transformation path
In contrast to other countries in the post-Soviet 
space, Moldova lacked strong presidential power 
in the 1990s and became the only parliamentary 
republic in the Commonwealth of  Independent 
States (CIS). Nevertheless, the pluralism of  the 
political system in Moldova was not based on dem-
ocratic values, but was the result of  weak political 
institutions. No player was able to change the rules 
of  the game, which led to a balance of  power 
between the different interest groups.
This changed in 2001 when the Party of  Com-
munists of  the Republic of  Moldova (PCRM) won 
parliamentary elections. With a majority in parlia-
ment, their leader Vladimir Voronin was elected 
president. Voronin established a political system 
that attempted to consolidate authoritarian rule by 
controlling business and the media, an absence of  
the rule of  law and an informal system of  rule.2 
This non-transparent and limited competitive politi-
cal system failed to implement necessary politi-
cal and economic reforms and polarized society. 
Despite this, Voronin was not able to consolidate 
his political rule.
Following increased dissatisfaction among the elec-
torate, the blatant manipulation of  the April 2009 
parliamentary elections led to mass protests. Voro-
nin had to call for new elections in July because 
of  his inflexibility in reaching a compromise with 
the opposition. The result was a narrow victory for 
the coalition of  the Liberal Democratic Party of  
Moldova, the Liberal Party, the Alliance Our Mol-
dova and the Democratic Party of  Moldova, the so-
called Alliance for European Integration (AEI). But 
because it lacked a qualified majority, the AEI was 
not able to elect a president. It had to again call for 
elections that took place in November 2010 and 
that confirmed a narrow victory for the coalition 
and continued the deadlock with the PCRM. The 
situation in parliament illustrates the split in Mol-
dovan society resulting from a division over three 
main issues: the model of  political power, national 
identity and the country’s geopolitical orientation.3 
Citizens have become frustrated about the failure 
of  the political leadership to reform Moldova and 
to give its people brighter prospects for the future. 
Moldova’s citizens don’t trust political parties or 
state institutions and there is no functioning legal 
system in the country. An opinion poll conducted 
by the Institute for Public Policy (Chisinau) in 2009 
found out that more than 50 percent of  inter-
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viewees felt Moldova was moving in the wrong 
direction. Political parties, the police and the courts 
turned out to be the least trusted institutions in the 
country.4
Weak private entrepreneurship and the state’s huge 
influence in the economy hinder market reforms, 
which would lead to more competition and increase 
of  quality of  products. An urban-country-divide 
that leads to a strong influence for the huge rural 
population, and a disproportionately high percent-
age of  elderly people among the whole population, 
makes large parts of  the Moldovan society open to 
a paternalistic model of  state.5 These characteristics 
stand in contrast to the younger generation and the 
smaller urban population, which see their future in 
the EU. Many people in this group leave the coun-
try for work and better living standards. However, 
both groups are united in their disbelief  that the 
political elites strive for a positive transformation 
of  the country.
The main transformation obstacles 
for Moldova
Without the prospect of  fundamental economic 
transformation, along with its lack of  natural 
resources, Moldova remains one of  the poorest 
countries in Europe. While the CIS as a region 
recovered to the 1992 GDP level by 2003, Moldova 
was only able to reach its 1992 output in 2008, and 
only for a short time. The main driver of  Moldo-
va’s economic recovery over the last ten years has 
been remittances from Moldovans, who have gone 
abroad (mostly Russia and the EU), which make 
up approximately one-third of  Moldova’s GDP.6 A 
lack of  economic reforms combined with an inef-
ficient and corrupt system of  state control over the 
economy limit the economic recovery. Moldova 
has been one of  the worst performers in Central 
and Eastern Europe in attracting foreign direct 
investment and in doing business.7 Moldova’s very 
slow and limited economic recovery ended with the 
financial crisis in 2008.
The main obstacle for the development of  Mol-
dova and its further integration in the EU is the 
conflict over the separatist region of  Transnistria. 
The conflict has both economic and political impli-
cations. Since the end of  the Moldovan-Transnis-
trian war in 1992, Transnistria has been ruled by 
the leadership of  the self-proclaimed “Transnistrian 
Moldova Republic.” It has established parallel 
institutions and managed to function as a state-like 
entity independent from Moldova. As a so called 
“captured state,” it is led by a business elite that 
centralizes power in the hands of  “President” Igor 
Smirnov, the head of  the main business group. The 
Transnistrian conflict does not have ethnic roots 
like other post-Soviet conflicts and is therefore 
widely considered to be the “easiest” conflict to 
solve in the whole region. However, over the last 
20 years the Moldovan state has been too weak to 
formulate and implement a viable reintegration pol-
icy. Moldova’s weak economic performance failed 
to attract the population of  Transnistria. But there 
have been signs that supporting the Moldovan gov-
ernment might pay off: In November 2005 the EU 
launched a Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) 
at the border between Ukraine and Moldova. The 
mission helped to fight smuggling and human traf-
ficking along the Transnistrian border and reduced 
the revenues of  the Transnistrian leadership. This 
helped to pressure the Transnistrian elites to find 
compromises to transact trade via Moldovan 
territory.
Competition between Russia and 
the EU
With their respective political and economic mod-
els, both Russia and the EU have influence on the 
Moldovan leadership. In the “bargaining” typical of  
post-Soviet states, President Voronin tried to bal-
ance between Russia and the EU to gain the most 
from both without having to implement fundamen-
tal reforms. With regard to the EU-Moldova Action 
Plan signed in 2005, the PCRM government imple-
mented only those reforms that offered clear finan-
cial benefits without weakening its political and eco-
nomic power. Only two of  ten priorities listed in the 
Action Plan were implemented, namely the creation 
of  conditions for the granting of  autonomous trade 
preferences and a re-admission agreement with the 
EU.8 In successive ENP progress reports, Brussels 
criticized Moldova for failing to implement chap-
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ters related to human rights, freedom of  the media, 
independence of  the judiciary, the fight against cor-
ruption, as well as an improvement of  the business 
and investment climate.9 The EU is partly to blame, 
since it failed to develop a credible mechanism of  
conditionality that can react to the political situation 
in Moldova. A lack of  clear demands and sanctions 
as well as the EU’s ignorance regarding the politi-
cal culture in Moldova are the main reasons for this 
failure from the EU side. Brussels concentrated on 
introducing new rules and regulations to a political 
system that is largely defined by informal rules and 
a lack of  functioning institutions. The EU’s ambi-
tious goals (such as fundamental reforms of  the 
socio-economic system) also stands in contrast to 
the modest funds (approximately 40 million Euros) 
Brussels has offered so far.
At the same time, Moldova is much more dependent 
on Russia than the EU. Moldova gets all of  its gas 
from Russia and the Moldovan economy tradition-
ally exports most of  its agricultural products to 
Russia. Russia is also Transnistria’s key partner for 
both financial and political support. It currently 
has around 1200 “peace” troops stationed there.10 
President Voronin tried to cooperate with Russia to 
resolve the territorial conflict over Transnistria and 
to negotiate a withdrawal of  Russian troops from the 
separatist region. But a resolution of  the Transnis-
trian conflict would limit Russia’s influence on Mol-
dova. Therefore, Russia wants Moldova to accept 
the continued stationing of  Russian troops and the 
federalization of  Moldova, which would guarantee 
a significant impact for Transnistria on Chisinau’s 
policy. Moscow pressured Voronin to sign the Kozak 
Memorandum in November 2003, which aimed at 
constructing a confederation between Moldova and 
Transnistria without giving Chisinau the instruments 
to influence the domestic situation in Transnistira. 
The memorandum would have secured Russia’s mili-
tary presence in Transnistria for 20 years.11
Aside from the multilateral negotiation format that 
includes Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as interme-
diaries and the EU and the US as observers (the so 
called 5 plus 2 negotiations), Moscow tried several 
times to push negotiations in a trilateral frame-
work with President Voronin and the leader of  the 
Transnistrian separatist region. But after resistance 
from the Moldovan opposition and pressure from 
both the EU and the US, Voronin decided not to 
sign the memorandum. In response, Russia closed 
its market for Moldovan agricultural products and 
doubled the price for gas to the country in 2005. 
In March 2006 the embargo was extended to wine. 
The value of  Moldovan exports to Russia reduced 
by almost 50 percent, from 347 million dollar in 
2005 to 182 million dollar in 2006, which worsened 
the economic situation of  the country even more. 
Russia is still Moldova’s single most important trad-
ing partner, but it is closely followed by Romania, 
a direct neighbor and Moldova’s biggest supporter 
in the EU. All EU member states together receive 
a larger amount of  Moldovan exports than Rus-
sia.12 Moldova is to a large extent dependent on 
Russia, which makes it more difficult for the EU 
to influence the country. On the other hand, if  the 
EU and its member states were to make a serious 
effort, they could be an attractive alternative for 
Chisinau. Yet this requires both a serious effort by 
Moldovan elites to implement fundamental reforms 
(introducing of  rule of  law, transparent privatiza-
tion and conditions for a competitive political 
system) and the will of  the EU to offer Moldova 
economic integration, which also means the risk of  
coming in conflict with Russia.
New approaches for Moldova and 
the EU
Under its new pro-European coalition, Moldova 
increased efforts towards a rapprochement with 
the European Union. After winning the July 2009 
elections, the AEI specified its common goals in 
their government program such as the restoration 
of  rule of  law and the decentralization of  power. 
The AEI started negotiations on an Association 
Agreement with the EU.13 The long-term goal of  
the new coalition is EU membership for Moldova, 
which the EU has not yet offered. Aiming for EU 
membership, the AEI gave up the balancing policy 
between Moscow and Brussels and concentrated 
its policy towards EU demands. The EU progress 
report from 2010 noted that dialogue with civil 
society has improved and that the transparency of  
the decision-making processes has increased. Prog-
ress was also noted in fighting corruption, reform-
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ing the judiciary system and with regard to human 
rights standards.14 Moldova decided to turn towards 
the European Union and in return was rewarded 
with greater financial support. Apart from a 100 
million Euro credit from the EU, Moldova received 
580 million dollar from the IMF in 2009 as well 
as a total sum of  1.9 billion Euros from several 
partners (such as the European Commission, the 
World Bank, the IMF and the United States) for its 
reform program “Re-Think Moldova.”15
However, implementing reforms within the limited 
capacities of  the bureaucratic apparatus remains a 
big challenge for the new government. After two 
years of  new rhetoric from the coalition, no fun-
damental reforms have been implemented. The 
inability to elect a new president because of  the 
deadlock with the PCRM and diverging interests 
within the coalition have hindered any real prog-
ress. The personal interests of  the coalition’s lead-
ers should be subordinated to the interests of  the 
country. On the other hand, the country needs 
more support from the EU in order to be able 
to modernize its administration. The EU should 
therefore put greater emphasis on increasing insti-
tutional capacities and help the Moldovan govern-
ment to understand the ways in which the EU 
functions.16 Brussels also has experience in fighting 
corruption and strengthening the rule of  law, and it 
should offer its expertise in both areas.
Visa-free travel within the EU plays a key role for 
the Moldovan government in winning over its 
people for economic and political reforms. The EU 
should explore this option to create better incen-
tives for the Moldovan government to reform. Visa-
free travel could also contribute to the resolution 
of  the Transnistrian conflict because it would make 
Moldova more attractive to the people of  Transnis-
tria. A German initiative set up in Meseberg in June 
2010 that aims at making Transnistria a text case for 
EU-Russia cooperation is a step in the right direc-
tion, but has brought no tangible results so far.17 
Russia does not want progress in the Transnistrian 
conflict, because then it would lose its tool to influ-
ence Moldovan policy. From the EU side, there is a 
need to take Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict 
more seriously and to develop a real test case for 
engagement. Such a step implies that the EU and 
its members have to be consequent in their negotia-
tions with Russia, even if  they risk a confrontation 
with Moscow. As long as the EU accepts how Rus-
sia uses the post-Soviet conflicts to secure the status 
quo and its own sphere of  influence, no break-
through will be achieved.
Instead of  “imitating integration”18 with its Eastern 
neighbors, the EU should concentrate on those 
countries that have a real interest in cooperating 
with the EU. Moldova is a country in which further 
engagement is likely to pay off. The EU should 
further develop its instruments, aiming at produc-
ing measurable effects. In the case of  Moldova this 
means starting negotiations for a Deep and Com-
prehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and reward-
ing reforms by opening up the European agricul-
tural sector to Moldovan products. Introducing free 
movement of  travel and building privileged institu-
tional relations should also be part of  the package. 
Brussels should finally put greater emphasis on 
support for civil society by improving access to EU 
programs like cultural and educational exchanges, 
voluntary service and assistance with effective civil 
society organization. On the other hand, Brussels 
should more clearly sanction countries, if  they do 
not fulfill the announced reforms. While there has 
been progress in Moldova-EU negotiations, there 
are delays in implementing major reforms by the 
current Moldovan government coalition.
As Ukraine’s change of  government in the 2010 
elections shows, the main challenge for the current 
Moldovan government is to stabilize its institutions 
against an authoritarian roll back and to implement 
fundamental reforms that actually change the rules 
of  the game. To allow for political competition, 
increasing the media’s independence and strength-
ening civil society are the main tasks of  the govern-
ment’s reform process. The EU should step up its 
support of  this process as well with effective car-
rots and sticks. Bringing Moldovan society into this 
major reform project would mean breaking with 
the Soviet legacy and allowing Moldova to take a 
real step in the direction of  an open and pluralistic 
European society.
Dr. Stefan Meister, Centre for Central and Eastern 
Europe of the Robert Bosch Stiftung, DGAP.
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